BETWEEN WASHINGTON & TEHRAN
December 1996
PURSUING MIRAGES & CONFRONTING REALITY
"In a scheme of policy which is devised for a nation, we
should not limit our views to its operation during a single year,
or even for a short term of years. We should look at its operation
for a considerable time, and in war as well as in peace."
Henry Clay (American Statesman 1777- 1852)
Recently, US officials formally declared that the United States
is interested in establishing communications, and even rapprochement,
with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In late October 1996, while on
an official visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Assistant Secretary
of State Robert Pelletreau expressed hope that the US and ban will
revive communications during President Clinton's second term in
office. "We are open to dialogue with the Government of Iran,"
Pelletreau declared. Asked about the Clinton Administration's attitude
toward the current policy of containment and isolation, Pelletreau
stated: "Nobr* thinks this is a perfect situation." Meanwhile,
in private communications, Washington once again asked Persian Gulf
governments which maintain good relations with Iran, to intercede
with Tehran in order to open up venues of" dialogue" with
Washington.
Washington's Illusions
to improving relations with the regime in Iran. Significantly, at
the very same time, the US hardened its declared position against
Iran, putting pressure on such allies as Germany and Japan to reduce
the volume of their commercial relations with Iran. Given the
contradictory
messages, little wonder that Tehran was confused about the sincerity
of the Clinton Administration. Moreover, concurrent Iranian strategic
studies reaffirmed Tehran's conviction that the unfolding regional
and global strategic dynamics was pushing the US and Iran to an
inevitable confrontation over the future of the Middle East and
the Muslim World as a whole.
Tehran assumed, and not without reason, that Washington was fully
aware of this reality. Hence, Iranian officials reasoned, there
was something sinister in the American initiatives -- a conspiracy
to undermine the Mullahs' regime. Therefore, Tehran chose to ignore
the American communiqués delivered by allies during the spring
of 1996. Undaunted by the Iranian rebuff, the Clinton Administration
sought new ways to convince Tehran of its sincerity. In the early
summer, the White House decided to go public with the US desire
to improve relations with Iran in an effort to reassure Tehran.
In mid June, President Clinton gave an interview to Al-Sharq al-Awsat
- a Saudi-owned newspaper published in London - in which he invited
Tehran to a dialogue with his Administration. Washington was "prepared
at any time to have a full and frank dialogue" with Tehran,
the President stated, as long as these contacts were with an authoritative
and official representative of Tehran. President Clinton went further
to assure Tehran of Washington's good intentions. He stated that
the US "does not seek to overthrow the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Nor do we seek a military
confrontation
with Iran." The President's message was aimed not only at
the Iranians - the obvious objective of these statements --but
also at the Saudi Government President Clinton now openly stated
what the Administration had been telling Riyadh and other Persian
Gulf states for a few months then. With the elections campaign
peaking and the President's foreign policy under sharp attack,
the Clinton Administration concluded that the paralysis of the
key initiatives must end. Hence, the obstacles to both the peace
process in the Middle East and the implementation of the Dayton
Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be removed virtually at all
cost. Thus, it became imperative to break the ice with the Mullahs
in Tehran and find ways to communicate in order to provide the
President with the "foreign policy achievements" he
needed so badly.
The Logic Behind the Initiative
By now, the Clinton Administration had to justify the drastic
change in its Iran policy. The official explanation was that this
initiative was motivated by Washington's own realization that
the policy of all out "containment" of Iran had failed.
The US has failed to isolate the clerics in Iran, or disrupt the
latter's economic connections with the rest of the world. Meanwhile,
several American journalists and columnists, including some very
close to the Administration, visited Iran and returned with tales
of growing pragmatism, and even moderation, of the regime. In
a series of columns and articles, they have urged rethinking of
Washington's present policy toward Iran and putting an end to
the all out confrontational attitude. Essentially, these articles
and columns provided public reinforcement for the preferable policy
of the Clinton Administration.
The Clinton Administration also seeks to justify the policy changes
by citing the urging from some of America's closest allies -particularly
Germany and Japan - to weaken the embargo in order not to harm
their own trade practices. Washington points out that several
Arab states, especially in the Persian Gulf, are also urging the
reduction of the level of tension between the US and Iran given
the extent of the clerics' threat -- both outright military and
Islamist subversion and terrorism -- they are facing. The European
and Arab allies insist that the policy of isolation and containment
is a relic of the Cold War and no longer fit the posture of the
"New World Order". Instead, the allies argue, the behavior
of even the most rogue states can be best amended through the
combination of "constructive engagement" and economic
incentives. Consequently, the Clinton Administration can portray
its initiative as a reaction to pressure from allies and advise
from experts.
Given the dire implications to its overall policies, the Clinton
Administration feels compelled to break the deadlock in the US
relations with Iran. "toward the end of 1996, there emerged
an
urgent need in Washington to prevent 'Tehran from toppling one
key foreign policy "achievement" of the Clinton Administration
after another. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tehran and its allies prevent
the implementation of the Dayton Accords. In the Persian Gulf,
the Mullahs and their local allies destabilize the region to the
point of near collapse of several governments allied with the
US. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic is behind
the wave of terrorism that led to the downfall of Shimon Peres,
President Clinton's favorite in the Israeli elections, and the
virtual collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Tehran-sponsored
terrorists are subverting Egypt and threatening the Mubarak administration.
The Mullahs' surge into Central Asia and their influence over
Turkey is growing. Islamic Republic has been implicated in numerous
acts of terrorism against the US, such as the recent bombings in
Saudi Arabia. Tehran was also implicated in a series of
political
assassinations throughout Western Europe. Indeed, in the Fall
of 1996, the US initiative policy was defined and articulated
to both the European allies and the states of the Persian Gulf
as a measure of last resort. In view of the temporary failure
of the confrontational containment and attempts to impose international
isolation, there remains perhaps a futile goal that economic incentives
and legitimization through communications will reduce militancy
of the Mullahs.
Tehran's Resolute Position
The only thing missing from this political initiative of the Clinton
Administration is comprehension of Tehran's position. From the
very first days of the Islamic Revolution, the essence of the
Mullahs' stand vis-a-vis the US has been that of a profound confrontation
that cannot be reconciled. The Mullahs' Tehran has never sought
to abide by the norms and logic of international relations. The
mere fact that terrorism constitutes a cornerstone of Iran's international
policy illustrates this point. The Mullahs need to make a 180
degree turn in the tenets of the Islamic Republic's political
doctrine before they could even begin to react positively to the
American initiative. And Tehran has made no such turns, neither
has it demonstrated even a slight inclination to do so. Not that
Tehran ignored the US efforts. Tehran could not miss both the
US initiative and the underlining logic behind them. Indeed, in
recent weeks, clerical leaders reiterated their objection to any
rapprochement with Washington. Starting early November, Iranian
media and other government circles, have repeatedly stressed not
only their objection to any rapprochement with Washington, but
emphasized that such a move will prove harmful to the vital interests
of the Islamic Republic.
In mid November, an editorial by'Ali Akbar Dareini in the English
language KAYIIAN INTERNATIONAL provided an authoritative reaction
to Secretary Pelletreau's invitation for a dialogue. Tehran examined
Pelletreau's statements in the context of the overall duplicity.
Dareini explains that "Washington s policy toward Iran has
two distinctive faces" aimed to contribute to the weakening
of the Mullahs' regime. One' face" is an effort to establish
rapprochement in order to neutralize Iran, and the other is a
commitment to pressuring Iran through confrontation. Hence, the
US initiative was but one facet of an on going policy.
Indeed, Dareini argues, Pelletreau's initiative was balanced
by threats from Washington over the Iranian conduct of International
terrorism. "Last month, the US Assistant Secretary of State
for the Near East Robert Pelletreau called, during a visit to
UAE, for a dialogue with Iran. And it has been confirmed recently
that the US Administration has written a letter to Iran threatening
to take action against Tehran if it continued what is says '.support
for terrorism'." Daremi concludes that the common denominator
of these two essentially contradictory approaches toward Iran
is that they are driven by the collapse of the regional policy
of the Clinton Administration. "While willingness to open
dialogue with Iran is viewed as Washington accepting its Middle
East foreign policy failure without recognizing Iran's rights,
the anti-Iran rhetoric like the recent letter is nothing but a
sign of frustration."
A very confident and assertive Tehran even warned the Persian
Gulf governments against taking part in this US political initiative.
This message was delivered by Iranian Interior Minister Mohammad'Ali
Besharati during his mid November visit to Doha, Qatar. Besharati
dismissed Washington's accusations against Iran for sponsoring
terrorism as yet another effort to exert pressure on Iran. "That
is not new. The United States always says that, but we are strong,"
he explained. Besharati concurred that the growing American frustration
with the failure of its Iran policy might push the Clinton Administration
into a military confrontation in the Persian Gulf. Tehran, he
said, was ready to confront any US move against Iran. "There
is no problem in this context, and we feel there is no problem
with regard to confrontation, but the region cannot bear such
talk." .
Besharati stressed that Tehran was convinced that the recent
US initiatives -- both the desire to establish a dialogue and
the threats concerning terrorism sponsorship -- were expressions
of despair because of the total collapse of the Clinton Administration's
policy. "They [the Americans] have suffered enough failures
in their foreign policy, and Europe is now confronting the United
States. It decided against a US decision to boycott us economically.
And the world opposed the United States in this connection."
Tehran, Besharati assured, had no intention what so ever to assist
the United States. Instead, Tehran invited its Arab neighbors
to join in a joint regional security system that will not include
or permit the presence of US and other foreign forces in the Persian
Gulf area. By late November, Tehran hardened its position. Iranian
officials now expect that the confrontation between the U.S. and
Iran will continue during
the second term of President Clinton. In an interview with AL-WASAT
-- a Saudi-owned weekly published in London -Ayatollah Mohammad'Ali
Taskhiri. the Iranian presidential advisor on international relations
and supervisor of Iranian cultural centers worlwide, was extremely
harsh in his attacks on President Clinton. "I believe that
President Clinton is under the control of the Jewish lobby up
to his ears. The positions taken publicly and in practice prompt
me not to expect any change in his attitude after reelection."
Ayatollah Taskhiri stressed that Tehran considers the recent US
initiatives to be a part of a plot against Iran. "We question
US political intentions and we know that they are hostile to us.
That is why we interpret any proposal for contact and rapprochement
as a mere maneuver because we know the American methods and schemes
to strike at the lslamic revolution everywhere and in all directions."
In view of the continued American threat to the Islamic Republic,
Ayatollajh Taskhiri concluded, there is no alternative to the
continuation of the resolute struggle against the i 1S.
Preserving Khomevni's Legacy
Further more, despite the lure of economic gains from a rapprochement
with the United States, Tehran left no doubt that such a move
is out of the question because it constitutes a profound deviation
from Khomeyni's teachings. Writing in RESAALAT, Alireza Shemirani
elucidated Tehran's approach to dealing with the United States.
"If one examines the practical and pragmatic aspects of
potential US-Iranian relations, it is possible to assume that
under certain conditions Iran might reduce hostility) toward the
US. The conclusion of such a view is that the hostili4 , between
Iran and America will not be permanent and it could even be claimed
that the establishment of relations with America is not an impossibility."
But under present conditions, Shemirani is quick to point out,
this only a theoretical issue. Presently, "while the Americans
are hostile to our people and country, we will continue to confront
them and defend ourselves. In this case, negotiating lvith America
or establishing ties with it will be unxvise and against our national
interests." But this overall approach to relations with the
US is based on the notion that both Iran and the United States
are just ordinary countries motivated by the evolution of their
respective interests. This perception, Shemirani argues, is a
gross mistake. Nobody can and should ignore that Iran is an Islamic
Republic and not an ordinary state. Therefore, Tehran must take
this unique ideological character into consideration when formulating
policies. Shemirani emphasizes that nobody in Tehran should forget
"that our revolution is a religious one, based on Islamic
values, and that Islam is a global religion and not confined to
a specific geographical location or