"If you have been fair with your subjects, you need not
fear your enemies."
Saadi-Iranian Poet (AD. 1194-1291)
It is time of grave and fateful decisions for the Mullahs' regime
in Tehran. At a time when the Mullahs should have been celebrating
a series of dramatic successes for the Islamists, they are confronted
with the need to launch another wave of international terrorism
and subversion against the US and its allies in order to save
their regime.
This seeming contradiction is an accurate reflection of Tehran's
analysis of the complex circumstances the Islamic Republic of
Iran finds itself in.
Tehran is convinced that it is, at the same time, both on the
verge of a major strategic surge in the Middle East, South and
Central Asia that will significantly strengthen the Tehran-led
Islamic Bloc, and on the eve of a major confrontation with the
US. This dichotomy in Iranian policy is the outcome of the Mullahs'
apprehension that once Washington realizes the gravity of the
strategic setback the presently unfolding Islamist surge will
bring about, the US will most likely react, perhaps even with
force, to reverse it.
Tehran presently believes that the likelihood of the implementation
and realization of their grand design -- the consolidation of
a functioning and strategically viable Islamic
Bloc -- has markedly improved as of late December as a direct
outcome of the elections results in Turkey -- the unprecedented
victory of the Islamists. Even though it is still uncertain that
the Islamists will lead Turkey's next government, Tehran considers
their mere winning the plurality of votes, a strong endorsement
of its own analysis of the present situation and emerging trends
in the Muslim World.
However, Tehran's world view and strategic perception are not
based on a single event, important as it may be, but on a careful
analysis of emerging trends and long-term forecasts. This analysis
has recently pointed out the approaching moment of crisis when
the West might attempt to actively contain the strategic surge
of the clerical regime in Tehran. This development is so important
that Tehran is actively considering the launch of preemptive and
preventive terrorism in order to contain the US ability to react
to the strategic developments in the Muslim World in a proper
and timely manner.
On December 26, 1995, a newspaper expressing the views of Iran's
Spiritual Leader Ali Khamene'i urged the launching of a world
wide campaign of anti-US terrorist attacks. '"The first step
is for parliament to allocate a special budget to help and-American
liberation movements around the world so they can use it at their
own discretion to attack US interests in any corner of the world.
This will be a first step in a legitimate preemptive action against
Washington's plans for sabotage and terrorist activities against
Iran."
Although the formal excuse for this call to action was the US
recent funding of effort to destabilize the Iranian regime, the
call to action was motivated by a major strategic requirement
-the urgent need to forestall US-led efforts to reverse the Islamists'
strategic gains. These gains were dramatically demonstrated in
the results of the elections in Turkey on the previous day --
hence the publicly expressed sense of urgency.
Indeed, the December 25 parliamentary elections in Turkey are
of crucial importance to the long-term strategic posture of Eurasia.
With all the votes counted, the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) won
with 21.32 percent of the votes. The Motherland Party (ANAP) came
second with 19.66%, while Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's True Path
Party (DYP) had 19.20%. Significantly, these results come in the
aftermath of the 1994 local elections in which the RP had major
achievements in elections to local governments, regional councils
and municipalities, including Ankara. The RP has a very successful
track record in handling domestic and local issues. The Islamist
local government administrations are considered (relatively) very
clean and corruption free. Their version of Islamic populism means
caring for the underprivileged and having their ear open to grassroots
opinions and desires. At the same time, the Islamists have refrained
from enforcing strict Islamic codes or interference with the economy
-- thus proving that they are not crazy' as their opponent portrayed
them to be. Inespective of the future Turkish government, for there
are efforts to have an ANAP-DYP coalition in order to block the
RP from reaching power, the Islamists are bound to influence Turkey's
policy. As the leader of the largest party in parliament, Necmettin
Erbakan will at the very least be the speaker/ chairman of parliament
-- a most powerful position in Turkish politics. Furthermore,
considering the overall popular support for the Islamists -- as
clearly expressed in both local elections and national parliamentary
elections -- any government in Ankara will no longer be able to
ignore the Islamists' point of view on both domestic and foreign
issues. "From now on Turkey's view of the world and the world's
view of Turkey have changed," Erbakan stated the moment the
initial elections results were known The main shift in national
polity strongly advocated by the Islamists is for Turkey to look
eastwards into Central and South Asia as the key to national strength.
The Islamists urge the revival of pan-Turkism in an ideological
and economic context. They argue for Turkey to join the Tehran-led
Islamic Bloc in a prominent position. This move would reduce the
adverse effect of the present Turkish-Iranian competition over
influence and market shares in Central Asia. Significantly, barring
the Islamic characterization, this is a policy advocated by many
Turkish politicians and economic experts associated with the right
wing parties as well. Others, advocate cooperation with Russia
in developing Central Asia as the future of Turkey. The common
denominator of these voices is a reversal of Ankara's recent emphasis
on integration into the West European community and closer ties
with the US. Considering the near collapse of the Turkish economy
under Ciller, the voices urging transfer of attention to the East
are being listened to very carefully in Ankara.
The main challenge facing the Islamists is the inherently secular
character of the majority of the Turkish population The RP has
long advocated gradual and moderated implementation of Islam and
not drastic enforcement of Islamist way of life. Tehran is fully
aware of this peculiar situation in Turkey. Therefore, the Iranian
initial reaction to the Turkish elections was predictable- expecting
more in foreign policy than in the domestic arena. "In view
of this important development in Turkey's domestic politics, it
seems that the foreign policy of this country will also change
its general orientations under the Islamists' influence to a certain
extent in favor of the Muslim world," Tehran said. "Experts
reject the possibility that the government and nonreligious parties
could ignore the existence of such a powerful Islamist party as
Welfare." At the same time, Tehran cautioned that "fundamental
changes resulting from this development will need a relatively
long time [to materialize]."
the near term, closer strategic cooperation with Turkey constitutes
the key to more than the implementation of the Iranian grand design
for both a regional hegemony and a surge into Central Asia. Anew
regional strategic posture involving Turkey will also help prevent
the realization of the Arab-Israeli peace process and overwhelm
the governments of Saudi Arabia and other Arab States of the Persian
Gulf. Tehran is convinced that the strategic first step toward
the drastic transformation of the Middle East is the consolidation
and strengthening of a westward axis with Iraq, Syria and Turkey.
Tehran recognizes that Turkey is the key to both the success and
failure of its grand designs. Turkey can be the key to Western
pressure on Iraq, leading to the formation of an axis comprising
Turkey, a post-Saddam Iraq, Jordan and Israel. Such a bloc will
encircle and isolate Syria from Iran, thus pressuring Damascus
to go on with the Arab-Israeli peace process, that is, acquiesce
to US regional hegemony.
The key to reversing such an eventuality is by winning over Iraq
and, at the very least, neutralizing Turkey. Further more, because
Iran is essentially broke, Tehran is looking for a regional dynamics
that will not only reduce the economic burden away from Iran,
but will actually improve the lot of Iran, Iraq and Syria.
In mid 1995, Tehran conducted complex negotiations with Ankara
and Baghdad toward the establishment of such a regional arrangement.
The essence of the deal orchestrated by Tehran is an improvement
in strategic and economic posture for the three states. Iranian
and Turkish officials also quietly raised the possibility of this
regional design with several West European governments and won
their tacit encouragement and support for the realization of this
regional posture. The Europeans know that such a development will
significantly increase the European exports to these states, will
lower the price of oil for the Europeans, and will reduce US influence.
Iraq was given the tacit encouragement by both Turkey and Iran
to reassert by force of arms its sovereignty over the Kurdish
parts, as well as expansion of its economic activities despite
the embargo. For Ankara, a direct consequence of such an Iraqi
military move will be the destruction of the safe havens of the
Kurdish guerrillas fighting against Turkey. Iraq will also begin
a clandestine export of oil via the Turkish pipelines, thus providing
Turkey with badly needed added income. A direct consequence of Turkey's
integration into the regional bloc will be the reduction of US
influence. The destruction of safe havens of anti-Iran Kurdish
guerillas, and the marked expansion of commercial relationship
with Iraq and Turkey are self-evident benefits for Iran from the
emergence of the Iran-Turkey-Iraq triangle. However, for Tehran,
most important is the anticipated reduction of US influence in Turkey
because this will enhance Iran's ability to conduct other strategic
surges. The closer relations with Iraq permits direct access from
Iran to Syria and Lebanon, thus breaking the Syrian isolation
and bolstering its commitment to confrontation with Israel. With
growing limits to US regional capabilities, and with a consequent
evaporation of the lure of massive financial "contributions"
to Syria as "peace dividends," Tehran is in a unique
position to reinforce its strategic alliance with Damascus and
reverse the "peace process."
Indeed, Tehran moved quickly to capitalize on the specter of
regional strategic change. Its first move was to exacerbate the
crisis in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Khartoum and Tehran sponsored
the assassination attempt on Egypt's President Mubarak, the bombing
in Riyadh, and a host of lesser subversive attacks in both Egypt
and Saudi Arabia. This is the beginning of a marked escalation
of Islamist subversion and terrorism. The situation in Saudi Arabia
was further complicated by the recent stroke and debilitation
of King Fahd. Consequently, the upper echelons of the House of
al Saud are immersed in an internal succession crisis which has
intensified the self-destruction of the House of al-Saud -- thus
making Saudi Arabia far more susceptible to Islamist subversion.
The Iranian confidence in their ability to soon
have a major impact on the strategic posture in the Arabian Peninsula
was expressed in the Sixth International Seminar on the Persian
Gulf convened in Tehran in mid December. The participants included
representatives of most terrorist and subversive groups from all
the states of the Arabian Peninsula. Iranian senior officials
addressing the conference explained that since the strategic circumstances
in the region changed, there was no longer need for the sanctions
against Iraq. They stressed that the primary threat to the region
is the US presence and efforts at strengthening hegemony. Tehran
emphasized the importance of the European efforts to counterbalance
the US uncontrolled desire for global dominance. Several European
governments support the deal with Iraq and Turkey. The Iranian
officials also stressed the strategic significance of the PRC-led
Trans Asian Axis. For the first time, there was an Iraqi semi-official
participation in the conference. An Iraqi representative discussed
the urgent need to establish an Iran-led "kind of strategic
alliance or at least tactical cooperation to foil the conspiracies
of the US and Israel in the region."
Meanwhile, the implementation of this design was being accelerated
in the fall of 1995. Most notable was the evolution in Syria's
regional policy. Most important was the rapprochement between
Damascus and Baghdad which was manifested in a deal on the definition
of their mutual border reached in early December. The new border
gives Syria sovereignty over the very productive Safiyah-39 oil
field, which Iraq will hand over with all the production systems
(pumps and pipes) in working order. Moreover, the opening of the
Syrian-Iraqi border, with the suppression of the Kurds, revives
cross-border trade, especially agricultural stuff and locally
manufactured goods, which is traditionally very vibrant and profitable
to both sides of the border.
For its part, Damascus demonstrated its commitment to the Iranian
policy by encouraging the HizbAllah to markedly escalate the fighting
in south Lebanon. The Syrian direct involvement was expressed
in the transfer by the Syrian military of massive military aid
from Iran to the HizbAllah camps in southern Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Ciller's Ankara was being lured into active participation
in the Iranian regional design. The combination of the failure
of the Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq and the growing
economic crisis strengthened the Turkish commitment to this strategic
course.
With Turkey's participation, it would be possible for Iran to
divert oil exports from Central Asia to Iran and Turkey (building
on and expanding the new pipeline system now being constructed
between Azerbaijan and Turkey). This development will also provide
cover for the illegal export of Iraqi oil. Essentially, closer
Iranian-Turkish cooperation will provide a boost for regional
economic development, Iranian recovery, and further consolidation
of a regional bloc around Tehran Indeed, President Nazarbayev
of Kazakhstan stresses the Iranian efforts to break their isolation
through expanded economic relations and raising the context of
a new regional pragmatic order even at the expense of the export
of fundamentalism. Kazakhstan will be willing to participate in
such a regional development for as long as there is no Iranian
effort to subvert the population.
By now, the summer negotiations between Tehran and Ankara have
already clarified that both Turkey and Iran have a common understanding
of the crucial importance of a surge into the Balkans under the
banner of political Islam. The Ciller government considered the
increase of Turkey's influence over the Muslims in the Balkans
a major instrument to improving Turkey's overall posture in Europe.
The Islamists in Turkey not only agree with this strategic analysis,
but have long made the support for the Muslims in Bosnia a major
priority in their revival of Islamist pan-Tuddsm. "I promise
I will work for a just order, to liberate Bosnia, Azerbaijan,
Chechnya and Jerusalem," read an oath Erbakan and thousands
of followers recited at a historical Istanbul mosque at the start
of the recent election campaign. Practically, the effective elimination
of the Kurdish terrorist problem through the joint bloc with Iraq
and Syria will free Turkish assets to concentrate on the Balkan
issue. The outcome of the Turkish elections makes Ankara an eager
and willing participant in this Islamist grand design, which gives
Tehran's grand strategy a major boost and reason for optimism.
In the context of political Islamism as advocated by the RP, there
is no substitute to Tehran's dominance as the source of Islamic
legitimacy and leadership.
Thus, for Tehran, the anticipated changes in Ankara, even if initially
incremental and slow, further a regional development that, if
permitted to be completed, will radically change the overall strategic
posture in a region of vital importance to the West. Tehran still
faces challenges, particularly the consolidation of a regional
hegemony through the Islamic Bloc, itself a component of the PRC-led
Trans Asian Axis, even though key member states are reluctant
to become Islamic states or severe all relations with the West.
Being on the verge of economic collapse, Iran is incapable of
providing economic assistance to substitute for the potential
loss of Western assistance. Nor can Iran provide substitute technologies
to what the West has to offer.
Therefore, Iran has to resort to subversion and manipulation
through terrorism, subversion and disinformation in order to build
regional support or acquiescence to Iran's policies. The most
successful is the Iranian approach combining waving the Islamic
banner and capitalizing on inherent fears of US/
West neo-imperialism. The fear of Iran-sponsored terrorism and
subversion always constitutes a further incentive for governments
to cooperate with Tehran.
The remaining issue for Tehran is forestalling a US reaction
to the unfolding process in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Tehran is fully aware of its centrality, and this led to the recent
call to preempt the US through increased support for terrorism.
Although this call was presented as a reaction to recent Congressional
appropriation, it is actually an expression of long-term planning
of how to prevent the US/ West from interfering with the implementation
of the Iranled regional surge. In the aftermath of the Turkish
elections, there is a sense of urgency in Tehran to neutralize
the US before it is capable of saving allies in distress, be it
Turkey or Saudi Arabia, as well as the establishment of Islamic
States in Egypt and Algeria. This public call for funding terrorism
is no idle threat. A major International Islamist terrorist conference
is planned in Tehran for around mid January 1996. The objective
is to chart new strategy for world wide assault on the US and
West, expand and escalate the Islamist revolutionary armed struggle.
A special priority of the conference is to decide on a confrontation
strategy against US/NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order
to prove that the Islamicization of Bosnia is irreversible. For
Iran and its allies, Bosnia is the key springboard to Islamist
terrorism and subversion in Western Europe.
Thus, even though several countries and organizations contribute
to the growing destabilization of the Middle East, Central Asia
and the Balkans, Tehran is the undisputed source of inspiration,
instigation and leadership. Considering the magnitude and diversity
of the concurrent Islamist threats, Focus on Iran believes that
the only realistic way to reverse this trend before a major eruption,
is the replacement of the current government in Tehran with a
democratic one. The Mullahs have repeatedly proven themselves
unwilling to abide by conventional international norms, and are
not likely to listen to reason when major strategic gains seem
within their reach. Therefore, there is no substitute to a change
of government in Tehran.
Further more, for such a change of government to succeed and
have a lasting effect, it must be accomplished by the Iranian
people themselves, guided by pro-Western Iranian opposition leaders.
It is imperative that such a change is carried out by the Iranian
opposition on its own and in a legitimate way, thus ensuring popular
legitimization and support for the post-Mullahs government in
Tehran. It is in Iran's interest to establish democracy and free
market in close cooperation with the West in order to expedite
the economic recovery. Considering the dire regional strategic
ramification of a lingering Mullahs' regime, it is imperative
for Iran, its neighbors, and the West that this change of government
in Tehran is implemented soon.