AMERICAN POLICY OPTIONS TOWARDS IRAN
March 1997
"There is no such thing as a fixed policy,
because policy like all organic entities is always in the
making. "
Robcrt A. Salisbury (British Statesman 1830-1903)
THEIR BENEFITS, COSTS, & RISKS
"There is no such thing as a fixed policy, because policy
like all organic entities is always in the making. " - Robcrt
A. Salisbury (British Statesman 1830-1903)
THEIR BENEFITS, COSTS, & RISKS
In the January 1997 issue of Focus on Iran in "an open letter
to President Clinton" the Azadegan Foundation pointed out that
any military action, or "surgical strike" against Iran
would be counter productive. It would serve only to strengthen the
political control of Mullahs inside Iran. Moreover, it is highly
likely that such action would also induce a retaliatory action aimed
at Iran's neighbors for perceived complicity in the U.S. military
action. Finally, it was pointed out that American action would very
likely enable clerical leadership to manipulate the feeling and
spirit of Iranian nationalism for its own dubious and questionable
aims. The question now before us is what solutions other than a
military option will yield the greatest benefits for both Iran and
indeed the United States, with minimal cost and risk to them. It
should d be noted at the outset, that there may likely be instances
where the national security interests of the United States will
not necessarily coincide with "what is best" for the Iranian
people. When this occurs it will be noted in this presentation. There
are those who strongly urge the United States to seek accommodation
and rapprochement with the Tehran regime believing this would be
best for the United States with minimum cost and risk. This is especially
appetizing to those who have vested interest in trade and finance
especially the petroleum market. From their perspective "what
is good for business is good for America". What is obvious
in this train of thought is the lack of concern for "what is
good for the Iranian people". The benefit which can be derived
from rapprochement generated from "dialogue" would be
minimal since it is unlikely that the ruling clerics have the inclination
to engage in a quid pro quo which sincere and faithful bargaining
and diplomatic negotiations require. The fact is that the ruling
clerics in Tehran have never sought to abide by the norms of international
relations and in essence, terrorism constitutes the cornerstone
of the Islamic Republic's domestic and foreign policy. The Mullahs
will indeed follow the policy that was initiated by Ayatollah Khomeim
and can not deviate from it.
Minimal Requirement For U.S.-Iran Dialogue
As mentioned in the open letter to President Clinton, the Azadegan
Foundation believes no dialogue or rapprochement with the current
Tehran regime can take place, at any level, until that regime agrees
to the following five stipulations to be made by the United States
government. These include:
1- Urge the Tehran regime to subscribe to all treaties and conventions
guaranteeing and recognizing human rights and basic freedoms for
its own people in Iran, and elsewhere in the international community
.This should be especially so for those émigrés opposing the regime.
2- Demand that the so-called Islamic Republic immediately cease
, or at a minimum renounce all acts of state-sponsored terrorism,
along with ending any interference in the affairs of other governments,
causing further instability in the region.
3- Exert intense international pressure on the Tehran government
to sign multilateral agreements to renounce acquisition and use
of weapons of mass destruction and civilian incapacitation.
4- Encourage Iran (along with other Persian Gulf states) to pledge
non-interference in innocent commercial traffic in the Persian
Gulf.
5- Send an unambiguous message to the clerical leadership that
the United States will not tolerate subversion or "harassment"
of American political and economic interests in the international
arena. Furthermore the United States must emphasize that the continuation
of such actions by the Islamic Republic constitute an extremely
unfriendly if not
provocative act which may result in an American retaliatory response.
From the perspective of optimal gain and benefit to the United
States, the Iranian people and the international community in
general, the above mentioned stipulations, if agreed to by Tehran,
would indeed be a great step forward towards solving the "Iranian
dilemma" for the United States. Moreover, it should be apparent
that the risks are minimal for the United States and the Iranian
people. For the Tehran leadership, it obviously means loss of
domestic power and the threat of losing hold on those clients
worldwide which it maintains through international & material
support.
There are six types of options that U.S. government could adopt
in response to intransigence and provocative acts of the Tehran
regime. These options are listed here from the most benign response
to the most aggressive.
1-The Option Of Economic Sanction
It is quite likely that the clerical regime would not accept the
above conditions put forward by the U.S. government, simply because
the former, in theory and practice, is anti-democratic, anti-U.S.
and anti-Israel, and thus, can not change its political behavior
and transform itself. What remaining options are then, available
to the United States? The most obvious are greater and more comprehensive
economic and political sanctions. The reality of economic sanctions
is that for the most part, they are not effective. This non-effectiveness
is largely due to the fact that many nations in the international
community, for trade and other financial resources, refuse to
adhere to the sanction protocol. In essence, they are looking
out for their own economic & financial interests rather than
the more abstract issues related to the sanctions. The targets
of these ongoing sanctions and boycotts, which incidentally have
been less than effective, include Cuba, Iraq and of course, the
most recent embargo on Iran. Even the Arab boycott of Israel of
the last three decades can be considered a failure despite the
threat of the Arab community to retaliate. In the case of Iran,
it is highly unlikely that the United States can bring the international
community, namely the world's leading economic powers to cooperate
in further extension of the present U.S.-imposed boycott. Again,
"doing business with the Islamic Republic" is in everyone's
best interest despite the illegal/immoral activities of the Tehran
regime in the international community and against Iranian nationals
in Germany and France.
The root problem for the United States is that it has no leverage
to apply, or incentive/reward to offer, those nations which comply
with the boycott/sanction. As long as Iran can provide the user
community with sufficient and moderately priced oil it will be
in position to off set any U.S. sponsored boycott/sanctions. The
loss for the united States would be one of prestige, credibility,
and perhaps even humiliation at the hand of its hated adversary,
the Mullahs of Tehran.
2-7he Option of UN. Condenwadon
Another option for the United States, more benign in nature, is
to bring about at the United Nations, the official condemnation
of that world body. Here again it is likely that at least one
of the five major powers of the Security Council (most likely
China or France) would exercise its veto right. Assuming no veto,
and a voted condemnation, the victory for the United States would
be a shallow one. It would be irrelevant for Tehran since they
have been flaunting world public opinion since coming to power
in 1979. For the United States the gain or benefit would be minimal
if not ephemeral a "feel good" sentiment which would
be fleeting.
3-The Option Of Blockade Of Iranian Ports And .Shipping
Could the United States, in a more aggressive show of force, initiate
its own blockade of shopping (all commodities excluding humanitarian)
to and from
Iranian ports? The act of blockade would run counter to the international
law and could result in world-wide condemnation of the United
States. The risk of the United States losing its legal and perhaps
moral standing in the international community is too great a price
to pay for such an action which in reality, would yield at best,
marginal results. More importantly, to carry out a successful
blockade, U.S. warships would have to forcibly stop and search
all ships under threat of lethal fire; an act of war in international
law. Can one imagine firing on an oil tanker of a friendly power, e.g.
France or Japan
4-The Option Of Regional And-Mullahs alliance and coalition
Another option available to the United States is to form an "anti
Mullahs" alliance of all the Persian Gulf states and perhaps
even including the remote possibility of including Pakistan. If
this scenario should succeed (hardly likely), it most likely would
result in some retaliatory act against at least one of the weakest
of the hypothetical alliance. The risk of military action on the
part of Iran and indeed, the United States is great. In such an
event, the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would be transformed
into an indefensible, highly vulnerable targets. The burden of
potential military intervention of the United States and physical
damage to participatory states is too great. The cost and risks
far exceed any imaginable gain to be derived by the United States
and much less on the part of participating members of putative
alliance.
5-The Option Of "Surgical .Strike"
The ultimate aggressive military option for the United States
against the Tehran regime is the "surgical Strike" against
selected military and economic targets. These targets may range
from identified facilities for production of weapons of mass destruction
to important lines of transportation/communications, oil production
and distribution facilities, and others deemed critical to the
nation's well being and survival. Although for many hard-liners
in the United States security establishment this would seem to
be the appropriate response to Tehran's intransigence and defiance
of American national interests, its repercussion may very well
exceed whatever benefits could be hoped for. At best, the benefit
gained is likely to be ephemeral- not lasting too long. It would
be in the nature of a psychological uplift for those people with
long-time frustrations over ruling clergymen's in Tehran. The
hoped-for benefit of teaching the Ayatollahs a lesson is most
certainly not going to resonate to change the behavior of the
clerics--in fact, just the opposite. Now the regime would have
the propaganda vehicle it needs to rally the people against the
United States' violation and injury to the Iranian nation.
More importantly however, in "surgical strike", as
accurate as state-of the-art technology can make the weapons,
collateral non-intentional damage and human casualties will occur;
this was clearly evident in the air attacks against Iraq in the
Persian Gulf War. It would be indeed ironic if innocent Iranian
citizen were forced to pay a heavy price for a regime which they
despise for its cruelty, harsh repression and gross violation
of human rights.
The cost to the United States could likely range from UN condemnation
(not too critical for the U.S.), to alienation of the friends
and clients of the region. More critical to the regional interests
of the United States is the potential of Iran forming an anti-American
coalition (e.g. with Syria ,Iraq and others) which could also
exacerbate political instability in those countries friendly to
the United States. In the extreme event, a U.S. military attack
on Iran could escalate in full-scale warfare between the two nations
in spite of the original intent of a "limited strike".
As is evident from history "limited" and "controlled"
military actions have a way of getting out of control with unforeseen
consequences.
Lastly, to be sure, the cost in American and Iranian lives makes
this option only the last resort-a response to an unambiguous
act of aggression against the United States, tantamount to an
act of war. It seems to us, only that type action, or at least,
as an act of preemption where there is unquestionable proof of
an immanent attack on U.S. assets and facilities.
6-The Optimum U.S. OPTION Support
The Iranian People In Their
struggle
For Freedom
The six options delineated above are by no means exhaustive; they
merely serve to demonstrate the most likely types of responses
nations employ to implement their will and power. Furthermore,
all the above cited options have some benefits, but for the most
part are seriously flawed by the likely costs and risks they would
incur. Risk and cost which would far out-weigh any derived benefits.
The Azadegan Foundation as stated in its Open Letter To President
Clinton, categorically believes that the only option the United
States should exercise against the clerical regime of Tehran,
is to support the Iranian people in their quest of replacing the
current despotic regime with a democratic one, attentive to the
primacy of human rights and liberties. By utilizing its moral stature,
its predominant position in the worldwide communications and the
media, and economic leverage, all means short of military threat
and actual military action should be utilized on behalf of the
Iranian people's bid for freedom. If this option is effectively
employed, the benefits to the United States and the Iranian nation
will be great in magnitude and extensive in scope. Coupled with
the derived benefits are the minimal costs in financial/buman
resources, national prestige, and long term commitment. Likewise,
the risks of military confrontation and act of war are at a minimum.
All the actions leading to the replacement of the current despotic
regime will and must be in the hands of the Iranian people.
The clerics have totally lost their national base and are ruling
with brute force. Recently, persecution of minorities, repression
of the people, harassment, kidnapping, torture of writers and
journalists (e.g. Mr. Faraj Sarkoohi has been recently kidnapped
by the government agents and nobody is aware of his whereabouts
) have been intensified. People of Iran being tired of tyrannical
rule of the clerics, are ready for change. With moral and political
support of the United States they will be able to bring about
this change, namely, freedom to Iran and stability to the region.